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Notes
CORPORATIONS UNDER THE BILL OF
ATTAINDER CLAUSE
HARRISON A. NEWMAN†
ABSTRACT
The Constitution’s Bill of Attainder Clauses, found in Article I,
Section 9 and Article I, Section 10, prohibit both Congress and state
legislatures from passing targeted statutes imposing punishment on
specified actors without trial. The Supreme Court has never decided
whether the Clauses apply to corporations.
The Second Circuit is the only federal circuit to address the issue
explicitly, holding in Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Pataki
that Article I, Section 10’s Bill of Attainder Clause applies to
corporations. Other circuits either have not faced the issue or have
assumed, for the purposes of the specific cases before them and without
officially deciding, that the Clauses apply to corporations. The Second
Circuit’s reasoning fails as a foundation upon which courts can rely in
administering future corporate attainder challenges—drawing dubious
inferences from inapplicable Supreme Court precedent and performing
a partial merits analysis under the guise of deciding this threshold issue.
This Note offers the first extended argument that the Bill of
Attainder Clauses apply to corporations. While the Clauses’ text is
silent on the issue, this Note considers the history and precedent of the
Bill of Attainder Clauses before exploring the Court’s approach to
corporate constitutional rights more generally. Assessing the theories
of corporate personhood undergirding the Court’s corporate
constitutional rights cases and the purposes for which the attainder
prohibition was adopted, this Note concludes that the Bill of Attainder
Clauses, properly understood, apply to corporations.
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On December 1, 2018, Canadian authorities detained Huawei
CFO Meng Wanzhou—the daughter of company founder Ren
Zhengfei—in cooperation with an extradition request by the United
States.1 The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New
York charged both Huawei—the world’s largest telecommunications
equipment maker and second-largest smartphone vender2—and Meng
with various crimes in what the Department of Justice characterized as
“a long-running scheme by Huawei, its CFO, and other employees to
deceive numerous global financial institutions and the U.S.
government regarding Huawei’s business activities in Iran.”3
Meng’s detention and subsequent prosecution inflamed the
already strained relationship between Huawei and the United States.
Hostility between the two parties had grown in the preceding months,
as federal prosecutors circled Huawei for potential violations of export
and sanctions laws4 and a trade war between China and the United
States grew increasingly hostile.5 On August 13, 2018, Congress
stepped in and passed the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (“NDAA”), which, among
other things, banned executive agencies, federal government
contractors, and federal loan and grant recipients from using any
“telecommunications equipment or services” made by Huawei and

1. Daisuke Wakabayashi & Alan Rappeport, Huawei C.F.O. is Arrested in Canada for
Extradition to the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/05/business/
huawei-cfo-arrest-canada-extradition.html [https://perma.cc/WM42-YC8M].
2. Dan Strumpf, Bigger Sales Than Apple? China’s Huawei Doesn’t Need the U.S., WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2018, 7:36 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bigger-sales-than-apple-chinashuawei-doesnt-need-the-u-s-1533296175 [https://perma.cc/4B8U-TUCZ].
3. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate
Huawei and Huawei CFO Wanzhou Meng Charged with Financial Fraud (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-telecommunications-conglomerate-huawei-and-huaweicfo-wanzhou-meng-charged-financial [https://perma.cc/5FTX-HJTC]. Meng was charged with
bank fraud, wire fraud, and their accompanying conspiracies. Superseding Indictment at 10–20,
United States v. Huawei Techs. Co., No. 1:18-CR-00457 (E.D.N Y. filed Jan. 24, 2019).
4. Karen Freifeld & Eric Auchard, U.S. Probing Huawei for Possible Iran Sanctions
Violations: Sources, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2018, 10:23 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usahuawei-doj/us-probing-huawei-for-possible-iran-sanctions-violations-wsj-idUSKBN1HW1YG
[https://perma.cc/LU3X-NTPQ].
5. For a timeline of major developments in U.S.–China trade dispute in 2018, see U.S.China Trade War Truce: What’s Happened and What’s Next, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 2, 2018, 2:22
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-02/u-s-china-trade-war-truce-what-shappened-and-what-s-next [https://perma.cc/F7KE-CFA8].
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four additional Chinese tech companies.6 Congress enacted the
“Huawei ban” amid longstanding suspicions that the company was
spying on Americans at the behest of the Chinese government.7
Huawei has repeatedly denied these allegations, asserting its
independence from Beijing.8 A few months after Meng’s detention,
Huawei filed suit against the United States in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas,9 challenging the NDAA’s ban as an
unconstitutional bill of attainder.10 That court has yet to rule on
Huawei’s challenge.
The Constitution contains two Bill of Attainder Clauses, which
together proscribe bills of attainder at the federal and state levels.11
Because the Supreme Court has treated its precedents for each of the
Clauses as controlling its analysis of the other, this Note refers to them
together as “the Bill of Attainder Clause” or “the Clause.”12 The Bill
of Attainder Clause prohibits both Congress and state legislatures

6. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No.
115-232, 132 Stat. 1636 (2018). The additional Chinese tech companies covered by the ban were
ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision, and Dahua. Id. § 889(f)(3)(A)–(B).
7. See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt, Keith Bradsher & Christine Hauser, U.S. Panel Cites Risks
in Chinese Equipment, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/us/uspanel-calls-huawei-and-zte-national-security-threat.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/93TZBVTV] (noting a 2012 House Intelligence Committee report concluding that Huawei and ZTE
present national security threats).
8. See, e.g., Li Tao, Huawei Fights Back Against Claim in Research Paper That It Is
Government Funded and Controlled, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 25, 2019, 4:09 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3007649/huawei-fights-back-against-claim-researchpaper-it-government-funded
[https://perma.cc/7TFL-VPWJ]
(“Huawei
Technologies . . . defended its independence on Thursday after a recent research paper
questioned the company’s claim to be employee-owned . . . .”).
9. Steven Overly, Huawei Sues U.S. as Legal War Intensifies, POLITICO (Mar. 6, 2019, 10:14
PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/06/huawei-sues-us-government-1209093
[https://perma.cc/M3LU-77E3]. Huawei’s American headquarters is located in Plano, Texas. Id.
10. Complaint at 10, Huawei Techs. USA, Inc. v. United States, No. 4:19-cv-00159 (E.D. Tex.
filed Mar. 6, 2019). The suit also alleged that the law violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause and the Vesting Clauses and resulting separation of powers. Id.
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.”); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.”).
12. Compare Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867) (analyzing Article I,
Section 10), with United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447–48 (1965) (distinguishing Cummings
in its analysis of Article I, Section 9), and Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866)
(same); compare id. (analyzing Article I, Section 10), with Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S.
716, 723 (1951) (distinguishing Garland in its analysis of Article I, Section 9), and Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889) (same).
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from singling out specified actors for punishment.13 The text of the
Clause, however, makes no mention of which actors its prohibition
protects: “No Bill of Attainder . . . shall be passed”14; “[n]o State
shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder.”15 The Supreme Court has never
determined whether the Bill of Attainder Clause extends to
corporations. As for Huawei’s pending case, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has once previously assumed that the Clause
covers corporations: “Even assuming that the Bill of Attainder Clause
applies to corporations,”16 the court wrote, before dropping into a
footnote, “[w]hich does seem likely.”17 The federal courts of appeals
have repeatedly employed this assume-without-deciding approach in
the limited number of corporate bill of attainder cases because the
constitutional challenges in those cases almost always failed on the
merits;18 the issue ultimately had no bearing on the outcome of
unsuccessful challenges.
The Second Circuit is the sole federal circuit to determine whether
the Clause extends to corporations, finding that it does in Consolidated
Edison Co. of New York v. Pataki (“ConEdison”).19 Despite
addressing the issue directly, the court’s analysis in ConEdison is
misleading and ultimately incomplete. Altogether, the opinion fails to
recognize a sound doctrinal basis for subsequent corporate bill of
attainder challenges.20 As courts continue to punt by assuming without
13. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 643 (2d ed. 1988)
(“The essence of the bill of attainder ban is that it proscribes legislative punishment of specified
persons—not of whichever persons might be judicially determined to fit within properly general
proscriptions duly enacted in advance.”).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
15. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
16. SBC Commc’ns., Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 234 (5th Cir. 1998).
17. Id. at 234 n.11. The court based its conclusion on Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S.
211, 239 n.9 (1995) (indicating that the Clause applies to laws that punish “a single individual or
firm” (emphasis added)). The Fifth Circuit’s reading of the Plaut footnote is deeply misleading,
as this Note will show in Part III.A. See infra text accompanying notes 178–96.
18. See SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 668 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“We assume, without deciding, that the Bill of Attainder Clause applies to corporations.”); Club
Misty, Inc. v. Laski, 208 F.3d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e may assume without having to
decide . . . that corporations as well as individuals are protected by the constitutional
prohibition.”); BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“We assume, as do the
parties, that the Bill of Attainder Clause protects corporations as well as individuals.”).
19. Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2002).
20. A contemporaneous student note takes a more optimistic view of ConEdison’s analysis.
See generally Seth A. Rice, Note, Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Pataki, 24 ENERGY
L.J. 131 (2003) (reviewing the case in detail and assessing the court’s treatment of corporate bill
of attainder protection favorably).
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deciding,21 the ultimate question of the Bill of Attainder Clause’s
protection of corporations lingers without an authoritative answer. Not
only will future meritorious challenges require such a determination,
but a clear elucidation of the rationale for why the Clause does or does
not cover corporations will also shape the ways in which courts
understand the substance of corporate attainder challenges before
them.
This Note offers the first extended argument that the Bill of
Attainder Clause extends to corporations, seeking to situate the
corporate constitutional right against bills of attainder within both the
Clause’s established understandings and general theories of corporate
constitutional rights. Following the Court’s practice, this Note
considers corporations generally and does not make distinctions
between the various corporate forms.22 This Note proceeds in three
parts. Part I examines the Bill of Attainder Clause at length, tracing
the history from attainders in English common law through the
drafting of the Clause at the Constitutional Convention and assessing
the Supreme Court’s bill of attainder precedent. Part II briefly explores
corporate constitutional rights at large, surveying the major theories of
corporate personhood and the Court’s ad hoc approach to determining
corporate constitutional rights. Part III evaluates the Second Circuit’s
defective analysis in ConEdison before demonstrating that the Bill of
Attainder Clause, properly understood, extends to corporations under
the leading theories of corporate personhood and a Clause-specific
purposive analysis.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION ON BILLS OF ATTAINDER
Adopted without debate,23 the constitutional prohibition on bills
of attainder establishes a right against “legislative acts . . . that apply
21. See, e.g., Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 909 F.3d 446, 454 (D.C.
Cir. 2018) (“Acknowledging that the question remains open, the government does not argue here
that the Clause protects individuals only. Therefore, absent an argument to the contrary and as
in our previous cases, we shall continue to assume that the Bill of Attainder Clause extends to
corporations.” (citation omitted)).
22. Elizabeth Pollman, Line Drawing in Corporate Rights Determinations, 65 DEPAUL L.
REV. 597, 600 (2016) [hereinafter Pollman, Line Drawing].
23. See JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH
FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 449 (Gaillard Hunt & James
Brown Scott eds., 1920) (observing one brief statement of support for the proposed prohibition
on bills of attainder and no statements of dissent); see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 95 (1956) (“At Philadelphia the prohibition
of bills of attainder was accepted without question.”).
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either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a
group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial
trial.”24 As Justice Black observed, “[h]ostility of the Framers toward
bills of attainder was so great that they took the unusual step of barring
such legislative punishments by the States as well as the Federal
Government.”25 English and colonial historical practices explain the
Framers’ revulsion to such laws, and case law reveals the ways in which
American legislatures have also attempted to single out disfavored
actors for punishment throughout the nation’s existence.
A. English Common Law and Early American Practice
Although historical accounts differ regarding the precise date of
the first bill of attainder, a consensus of scholars agree that the fifteenth
century marked the onset of the practice.26 In his Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States, Justice Story described bills of
attainder as “special acts of the legislature, as inflict capital
punishments upon persons supposed to be guilty of high offences, such
as treason and felony, without any conviction in the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings.”27 Traditional bills of attainder also required the
attainted individual to forfeit property,28 extending beyond all personal
and real property to the denial of inheritance both to and from the
individual—a practice known as the corruption of blood.29
Similar in spirit though far less severe, bills of pains and penalties
were “legislative convictions which imposed punishments less than that
of death.”30 Such punishments included “imprisonment, banishment,
and the punitive confiscation of property by the sovereign.”31 The
24. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
25. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 876 (1960).
26. See, e.g., CHAFEE, supra note 23, at 98 (pointing to a bill enacted in 1450 as an imprecise
historical “starting-point”); HAROLD POTTER, POTTER’S OUTLINES OF ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 100 (A.K.R. Kiralfy ed., 5th ed. 1958) (“The first Act of Attainder seems to have been
that of the Duke of Clarence in 1477.”); J.R. Lander, Attainder and Forfeiture, 1453 to 1509, 4
HIST. J. 119, 120 (1961) (“During the fifteenth century the penalty of attainder was for the first
time imposed by act of Parliament.”)
27. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 27
(2d ed. 1851).
28. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 284 (1880) [hereinafter COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES].
29. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *388.
30. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 261 (1868)
[hereinafter COOLEY, TREATISE].
31. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 474 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
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practice died out over the next century and a half, with the eventual
passage of the final bills of attainder in 179832 and pains and penalties
in 1820.33
By their very definition, traditional bills of attainder could not be
imposed on corporations. William Blackstone expressly observed that
a corporation was not “capable of suffering a traitor’s or felon’s
punishment, for it is not liable to corporal penalties, nor to attainder,
forfeiture, or corruption of blood.”34 Parliament did pass punitive bills
directed at municipalities structured as corporations,35 but it is unclear
if English commentators considered these acts to be true bills of pains
and penalties. Blackstone commented briefly on the practice, noting
that a corporation may “itself be dissolved in several ways, which
dissolution is the civil death of the corporation,”36 with one way being
“[b]y act of parliament, which is boundless in its operations.”37
The legislatures of the fledgling United States also enacted
comparable bills. In the immediate aftermath of the American
Revolution, “every state in the Union appears to have enacted bills of
pains and penalties of greater or less severity.”38 Such bills were
commonplace against remaining Loyalists,39 enacted indiscriminately
to address both small ills as well as “cases involving danger to the
commonwealth for which they were supposed to be reserved.”40

32. CHAFEE, supra note 23, at 136.
33. Id.
34. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *476–77.
35. See, e.g., Disfranchisement of Grampound Act 1821, 1 & 2 Geo. 4 c. 47 (Eng.)
(disfranchising a borough of its two Members of Parliament after finding bribery and corruption);
Cricklade Act 1782, 22 Geo. 3 c. 31, § 1 (Eng.) (changing the qualifications for voting in a borough
after finding bribery and corruption).
36. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *484.
37. Id. at *484–85.
38. Edward S. Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of
Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 511, 515 (1925);
see also CLAUDE HALSTEAD VAN TYNE, THE LOYALISTS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 268–
85 (1902) (providing a detailed account of the various bills passed against remaining Loyalists
after the Revolution).
39. See, e.g., COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 28, at 284–85 (noting bills of pains
and penalties imposed on Loyalists after the American Revolution); COOLEY, TREATISE, supra
note 30, at 262 (describing legislative punishments of British and Loyalist residents of the states
during the Revolutionary period).
40. Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1914).
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B. Supreme Court Precedent
The Constitution’s ratification breathed new significance into “bill
of attainder” as an American legal term. The Supreme Court first
considered the term’s meaning in 1798 in Calder v. Bull.41 There, in a
seriatim opinion, Justice Chase wrote of “the denomination of bills of
attainder, or bills of pains and penalties; the first inflicting capital, and
the other less, punishment.”42 Sometimes, these acts “inflicted
punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to any
punishment; and in other cases, they inflicted greater punishment, than
the law annexed to the offence.”43 Commentators have since debated
whether Justice Chase was suggesting a constitutional distinction
between the two types of bills.44
The Court next considered the Bill of Attainder Clause’s meaning
in 1810 in Fletcher v. Peck,45 which featured an influential dictum about
Article I, Section 10, which includes the Bill of Attainder Clause, Ex
Post Facto Clause, and Contracts Clause, among others.46 Chief Justice
Marshall noted that “the framers of the constitution viewed, with some
apprehension, the violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of
the moment.”47 In adopting the Constitution, “the people of the United
States . . . manifested a determination to shield themselves and their
property from the effects of those sudden and strong passions to which
men are exposed.”48 Chief Justice Marshall went on to assert that “[t]he
restrictions on the legislative power of the states are obviously founded
in this sentiment,” as he deemed Article I, Section 10 “a bill of rights

41. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
42. Id. at 389 (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphases omitted).
43. Id. (emphases and footnotes omitted). Justice Iredell also made a brief note about
majoritarian will and attainders, writing that “[r]ival factions, in their efforts to crush each other,
have superseded all the forms, and suppressed all the sentiments, of justice; while attainders, on
the principle of retaliation and proscription, have marked all the vicissitudes of party triumph.”
Id. at 399–400 (opinion of Iredell, J).
44. Compare Raoul Berger, Bills of Attainder: A Study of Amendment by the Court, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 355, 370 (1978) (arguing that Justice Chase’s Calder opinion recognized a
distinction between bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties), with Anthony Dick, Note,
The Substance of Punishment Under the Bill of Attainder Clause, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1177, 1187–88
(2011) (arguing that Justice Chase’s Calder opinion suggested a blurred line between the two).
45. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law,
or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”).
47. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 137–38.
48. Id.
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for the people of each state.”49 He concluded with a loose definition:
“A bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may
confiscate his property, or may do both.”50 With this statement, Chief
Justice Marshall espoused a clear view that for constitutional purposes,
bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties.
1. The Confederate-Sympathizer Era: Developing Doctrine. The
Court faced its first Bill of Attainder Clause challenges in 1866, when
it decided The Test Oath Cases51: Cummings v. Missouri52 and Ex parte
Garland.53 In these cases, the Court struck down state oaths that
imposed punitive measures on suspected Confederate sympathizers—
in Cummings, forbidding them from serving as priests,54 and in
Garland, forbidding them from practicing law.55
In Cummings, the Court unequivocally reaffirmed Chief Justice
Marshall’s understanding of bills of attainder from Fletcher: “Within
the meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains
and penalties.”56 The challenged Missouri constitutional amendment
imposed a wide-ranging oath of allegiance on public officials, corporate
directors, professors, teachers, and clergymen entering those
professions.57 Although the oath did not expressly declare the guilt of
those who refused to take it and instead adjudged punishment
subsequently only upon such refusal, the difference was “one of form
only, and not of substance.”58 Garland featured a similar test oath, this
one passed by Congress and applying to attorneys practicing in the
federal courts.59 Relying on Cummings, the Court found that the
Congressional oath similarly “operate[d] as a legislative decree of
perpetual exclusion,” which constituted punishment.60
The final years of the century saw two unsuccessful bill of
attainder challenges against professional-qualification requirements in
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 411 (Edmund H. Bennett ed., 10th ed. 1888).
52. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
53. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
54. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 316–17.
55. Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 374–75.
56. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 323.
57. Id. at 316–17.
58. Id. at 325.
59. Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 374.
60. Id. at 377.
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Dent v. West Virginia61 in 1889 and in Hawker v. New York62 in 1898. In
Dent, the Court upheld a state law requiring physicians to obtain a
degree from an accredited medical school in order to secure a medical
license because it was a bona fide judgment of requisite professional
qualifications.63 And in Hawker, the Court followed the same rationale
in upholding a state law prohibiting convicted felons from practicing
medicine.64
2. The Lovett Bellwether and Justice Frankfurter’s Historicism.
The Court heard its next bill of attainder challenge in 1946 in United
States v. Lovett.65 Lovett was a challenge to a section of an
appropriations bill that prohibited three named federal employees
from being paid unless they were confirmed by the Senate.66 In holding
that the section was a bill of attainder,67 the Court looked to the bill’s
legislative history to determine the section’s purpose, finding a punitive
legislative motive.68 The Court then reviewed the Test Oath Cases,
reading them to “stand for the proposition that legislative acts, no
matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder
prohibited by the Constitution.”69
Justice Frankfurter wrote an influential concurrence in Lovett,
arguing that the Bill of Attainder Clause was defined by the historical
grievances that motivated the Framers to draft it.70 According to

61. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
62. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
63. Dent, 129 U.S. at 127–28. In contrast, the Test Oath Cases did not impose legitimate
qualification requirements. Id. at 128.
64. Hawker, 170 U.S. at 195, 200.
65. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). Noting the substantial time gap between
bill of attainder cases, Professor John Hart Ely remarked that “[t]he term ‘bill of attainder’ must
therefore have seemed archaic when applied to World War II legislation. No member of the Court
of the early forties had so much as mouthed the words; it was far from clear that they ever would.”
John Hart Ely, United States v. Lovett: Litigating the Separation of Powers, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 15 (1975).
66. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 304–05.
67. Id. at 315.
68. Id. at 308–14.
69. Id. at 315.
70. Id. at 321 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Thomas B. Griffith, Note, Beyond Process: A
Substantive Rationale for the Bill of Attainder Clause, 70 VA. L. REV. 475, 485 (1984) (“Justice
Frankfurter’s historical approach to the bill of attainder clause commanded a Supreme Court
majority for roughly twenty years after Lovett.” (footnote omitted)).
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Justice Frankfurter, the Constitution did not define bill of attainder
because its “meaning was so settled by history that definition was
superfluous.”71 History had defined bill of attainder to mean “the
substitution of legislative determination of guilt and legislative
imposition of punishment for judicial finding and sentence.”72 Justice
Frankfurter’s narrow view guided the Court in a sequence of four
cases—American Communications Association v. Douds73 in 1950,
Garner v. Board of Public Works74 in 1951, Flemming v. Nestor75 in
1960, and Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities
Control Board76 in 1961—before the Court offered its current attainder
doctrine.
3. Brown’s Foundation and Beyond: Contemporary Doctrine.
Although the 1946 Lovett decision served as a preview of the Court’s
contemporary bill of attainder jurisprudence, the Court did not revisit
its broader doctrine until United States v. Brown77 in 1965. In Brown,
the Court struck down a federal bill of attainder making “it a crime for
a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or (except in
clerical or custodial positions) as an employee of a labor union.”78
The Court began its analysis with the “logical starting place” of
the Bill of Attainder Clause’s historical background79 before
considering “the reasons for [the Clause’s] inclusion in the
Constitution, and the evils it was designed to eliminate.”80 The Court
asserted that “the Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as a
narrow, technical . . . prohibition, but rather as an implementation of
the separation of powers, a general safeguard against legislative
exercise of the judicial function, or more simply—trial by legislature.”81

71. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 321.
72. Id. at 321–22.
73. Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
74. Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
75. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
76. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1
(1961).
77. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
78. Id. at 438, 461–62.
79. Id. at 441.
80. Id. at 442.
81. Id. Ely served as a law clerk to Brown’s author, Chief Justice Warren, when Brown was
decided, see JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 188 (1996), and he had written an
unsigned student comment making this very argument just three years earlier. See generally
Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder
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Beyond implementing the proper separation of powers among the
legislative and judicial branches, the Clause “also reflected the
Framers’ belief that the Legislative Branch is not so well suited as
politically independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the
blameworthiness, of, and levying appropriate punishment upon,
specific persons.”82 Seeking to guard against the will of the excitable
majority, the Clause properly “limit[ed] legislatures to the task of rulemaking.”83
The Court’s analysis ultimately turned on specificity and
punishment. Brown noted that Congress singled out “members of the
Communist Party” in the challenged section, which demonstrated that
“it plainly is not the case that Congress has merely substituted a
convenient shorthand term for a list of the characteristics it was trying
to reach”—in this case, individuals likely to provoke political labor
strikes.84 Rejecting as “archaic” a limiting definition of punishment
solely as retribution, the Court went on to find that the legislation
“inflict[ed] ‘punishment’ within the meaning of the Bill of Attainder
Clause” through a broad understanding encompassing retribution,
rehabilitation, deterrence, and prevention.85 The Court’s opinion
concluded with an overarching message: “Congress must accomplish
[its desired] results by rules of general applicability. It cannot specify
the people upon whom the sanction it prescribes is to be levied.”86
Since Brown, the Court has heard only two bill of attainder cases:
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services87 in 1977 and Selective
Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group88 in 1984.
In Nixon, the Court upheld the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act in the face of a bill of attainder challenge.89 The Act
ordered an executive branch official “to take custody of the
Presidential papers and tape recordings of . . . former President

Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330 (1962) [hereinafter Ely, Comment]. Ely acknowledged having written
this comment. John Hart Ely, The Limits of Logic: Syntactic Ambiguity in Article One of the U.S.
Constitution, 4 M.U.L.L.: MOD. USES LOGIC L. 117, 117 n.1 (1963).
82. Brown, 381 U.S. at 445.
83. Id. at 446.
84. Id. at 456.
85. Id. at 458.
86. Id. at 461.
87. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
88. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841 (1984).
89. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 484.
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Richard M. Nixon” and to promulgate corresponding regulations.90
Emphasizing that the Bill of Attainder Clause does not limit “Congress
to the choice of legislating for the universe, or legislating only benefits,
or not legislating at all,”91 the Court noted that the Act’s specificity in
referencing only Nixon “does not automatically offend the Bill of
Attainder Clause” and “can be fairly and rationally understood”
because Nixon was the only president whose effects were not yet under
congressional control—Nixon “constituted a legitimate class of one.”92
In addition to the new “legitimate class of one” language, Nixon is
notable for its tripartite analysis of punishment, composed of historical,
functional, and motivational tests.93 The historical test looks to “the
substantial experience of both England and the United States” for “a
ready checklist of deprivations and disabilities” that “would be
immediately constitutionally suspect.”94 The functional test analyzes
“whether the law under challenge, viewed in terms of the type and
severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further
nonpunitive legislative purposes.”95 Specifically, “[w]here such
legitimate legislative purposes do not appear, it is reasonable to
conclude that punishment of individuals disadvantaged by the
enactment was the purpose of the decisionmakers.”96 Finally, the
motivational test considers “whether the legislative record evinces a
congressional intent to punish.”97 The results of these tests are
balanced to determine the legislation’s constitutionality, and a
challenged statute need not fail each test to be an unconstitutional bill
of attainder.98

90. Id. at 429.
91. Id. at 471.
92. Id. at 472.
93. Id. at 473–83.
94. Id. at 473.
95. Id. at 475–76.
96. Id. at 476.
97. Id. at 478.
98. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 350 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“Nixon makes it clear that a statute need not fit all three factors to be considered a bill of
attainder; rather, those factors are the evidence that is weighed together in resolving a bill of
attainder claim.”); see also Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“The
Court has applied each of these criteria as an independent – though not necessarily decisive –
indicator of punitiveness. . . . Our cases have noted, however, that the second factor – the socalled ‘functional test’ – invariably appears to be the most important of the three.” (quotations
omitted)).
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In 1984, the Court in Selective Service System rejected a bill of
attainder challenge to a section of the Military Selective Service Act,
“which denie[d] federal financial assistance under Title IV of the
Higher Education Act of 1965 to male students who fail to register for
the draft.”99 The Court noted that the challenged section did not single
out nonregistrants because it allowed them to seek Title IV’s financial
assistance if they registered for selective service belatedly upon
receiving notice of their unregistered status.100 Applying the three tests
for punishment from Nixon, the Court found that the section did not
impose punishment either.101 The Court has not subsequently heard
any bill of attainder cases.
II. CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
“It is often said that corporations have no souls.”102 True enough.
But, of course, our law’s protection is not limited to natural persons:
corporations have long enjoyed constitutional rights. The Supreme
Court first considered whether a constitutional provision extended to
corporations in 1809 in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux,103 in which
it held that the Bank was a citizen for the purposes of diversity
jurisdiction under Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789.104 While
the Court has since denied corporations various constitutional
protections,105 it has proceeded on a case-by-case basis to recognize a
broad swath of corporate constitutional rights.106

99. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 843 (1984).
100. Id. at 849–50.
101. Id. at 851–56.
102. Thomas Thacher, Incorporation, 9 YALE L.J. 82, 84 (1899).
103. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809), overruled in part by
Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
104. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to
Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States . . . .” (emphasis added)); Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (“[O]r the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is
brought, and a citizen of another State.”).
105. See, e.g., Hale v Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1906) (Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868) (Privileges and Immunities
Clause).
106. See, e.g., Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (Free Press Clause);
Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) (Takings Clause); Cty. of Santa
Clara v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (Equal Protection Clause); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll.
v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 590 (1819) (Contracts Clause). For a concise yet complete
history of the Court’s corporate constitutional rights jurisprudence, see generally Margaret M.
Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Supreme Court’s View of Corporate Rights: Two Centuries of
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In more than two centuries of cases, the Court has offered no clear
or consistent test under which to analyze corporate constitutional
rights.107 Two primary analytical frameworks offer distinct approaches
to the issue. One option comes from the Court’s differing conceptions
of corporate personhood, a doctrine recognizing that “[o]ne of the
fundamental defining characteristics of the corporation is that it
constitutes a separate legal person with rights and obligations distinct
from those of its owners.”108 A second option lies in a footnote in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,109 which sets out the closest thing
the Court has formulated to a test for corporate constitutional rights.110
This Part will address these two frameworks in turn.
A. Corporate Personhood
Since the very creation of the corporate form, jurists have
struggled to craft a blanket definition of the corporation.111 One
reasonable starting point is to observe that “[i]n the United States, the
technical, albeit tautological, answer is that it is an entity recognized by
state law as a ‘corporation.’”112 Tautology offers descriptive precision

Evolution and Controversy, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 245 (Naomi R.
Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017).
107. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 95, 98 (2014) (“What theory explains why corporations have some constitutional rights and
not others? The Supreme Court has not offered a general theory.”); Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns,
Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 887, 909 (2011) (“The Court’s approach has left us with a broken and disjointed
jurisprudence, a string cite rather than a doctrine.”); Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional
Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation After First
National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1348 (1979) (“Missing from the Court’s various
decisions involving corporations is any expressly enunciated common rationale. Many cases
appear to involve an ad hoc determination rather than the development or application of a
general principle.”); Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 50
(2014) [hereinafter Pollman, A Corporate Right] (“In all of this time, [the Court] has failed to
articulate a test or standard approach for its rulings.”).
108. Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42
SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 884 (2012).
109. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978).
110. See, e.g., Pollman, A Corporate Right, supra note 107, at 52 (“Perhaps the closest the
Court has come to providing a corporate rights test was in a footnote in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti . . . .”).
111. See, e.g., Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public
Personality of the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 201 (2006) (“The inability of legal
theory to account for the character of the corporation is a longstanding problem.”).
112. Elisabeth de Fontenay, Individual Autonomy in Corporate Law, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
183, 184 (2018).
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here, as corporations truly are defined by state law.113 Yet when courts
consider whether corporations possess certain constitutional rights, a
thorough reading of the Delaware General Corporation Law, for
example, does little work.
Rather than agonize over the substance of state law, theories of
corporate personhood engage more directly with questions about legal
entitlements. Deeply misunderstood,114 corporate personhood is, at its
core, the idea of “corporations as right[s] holders.”115 In other words,
“a corporation has its own independent identity in the eyes of the law,
wholly separate from the people who comprise it.”116 Corporate
personhood has undergirded the Court’s piecemeal consideration of
the Constitution’s application to corporations since the process began
in 1809 in Deveaux. There, the Court understood the corporation to be
“a mere creature of the law, invisible, intangible, and incorporeal,”117
although “this invisible, incorporeal creature of the law may be
considered as having corporeal qualities.”118
Even as the Court has not espoused a unified understanding of
corporate personhood in its corporate constitutional rights cases,119
three primary theories of corporate personhood—the artificial entity
theory, the real entity theory, and the aggregation theory—have largely
persisted since the creation of the corporate form in Roman law more
than two thousand years ago.120 And the Court has endorsed each
theory at various points in its corporate constitutional rights cases.
1. Artificial Entity Theory.
The artificial entity theory
predominated the Court’s corporate constitutional right cases through
113. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(a) (2016) (allowing any person or entity to
incorporate in Delaware by filing “a certificate of incorporation which shall be executed,
acknowledged and filed in accordance with [statutory requirements]”).
114. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought,
76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1640 (1988) (“The idea that a corporation is a ‘person’ for legal purposes is one
of the most misunderstood doctrines in American legal history.”).
115. Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1629.
[hereinafter Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood].
116. Adam Winkler, Essay, What Rights Should Corporations Have?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1,
2018, 10:50 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-rights-should-corporations-have-1519919444
[https://perma.cc/2VRW-V8MA].
117. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 88 (1809), overruled in part
by Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
118. Id. at 89.
119. Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 115, at 1657.
120. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WISC. L. REV. 999,
1000–01.
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roughly 1850,121 understanding “the corporation as an entity existing
separately from its shareholders and other participants.”122 Under this
view, the corporation was artificial because it “owed its existence to the
positive law of the state rather than to the private initiative of
individual incorporators.”123 In other words, the corporation was “a
state-created reification.”124 At the time of the Founding, state
legislatures retained the power to grant corporate charters.125 This era
predated the onset of general state incorporation laws; instead, the
formation of each individual corporation required a special legislative
act.126 On this basis, if the corporation were simply a fictional
creation—a concession or grant127—of the state, the government ought
to be able to regulate it, rendering it a partial rather than complete
authorization to operate in the corporate form.128 In 1819, Chief Justice
Marshall described the corporation in Trustees of Dartmouth College
v. Woodward,129 the “seminal Supreme Court case adopting the
artificial entity theory,”130 as “an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of
law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation
confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very
existence.”131 In our current era, however, the artificial entity theory

121. William W. Bratton Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1483–85 (1989).
122. David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 205–06.
123. Id. at 206.
124. Bratton, supra note 121, at 1484.
125. Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an
Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393, 404 (1982).
126. Millon, supra note 122, at 206.
127. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W.
VA. L. REV. 173, 181 (1985) (“‘[G]rant’ or ‘concession’ theory . . . treated the act of incorporation
as a special privilege conferred by the state for the pursuit of public purposes. Under the grant
theory, the business corporation was regarded as an artifical [sic] being created by the state with
powers strictly limited by its charter of incorporation.” (footnote and quotations omitted)).
128. Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 115, at 1635.
129. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
130. Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed
Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 69 (2005).
131. Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636. The Dartmouth College opinion did not
expressly indicate that it extended beyond charitable corporations. See, e.g., Robert Sprague Hall,
The Dartmouth College Case, 20 GREEN BAG 244, 244 (1908) (“The most obvious feature of the
decision is that it concerns, and is authoritative for, the charters of one class only of corporations,
the class including those of the type of Dartmouth College, that is, private eleemosynary
institutions.”). But “the Court’s ruling was understood as extending to all private corporations,
including business corporations.” Pollman, Line Drawing, supra note 22, at 604.
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has fallen out of style.132 But Chief Justice Marshall’s conception of the
artificial entity remains a favorite of judges today,133 perhaps for its
florid language.
2. Real Entity Theory. As the number of corporations grew from
the 1850s through the 1880s, the accompanying legal conception moved
“away from juridical constructs and toward the social reality of the
business and the creative energy of the individuals conducting it.”134 In
this era, states shifted from issuing individual corporate concessions to
enacting largely standardized general corporation laws with
“provisions respecting corporate purposes, directors’ powers, capital
structure, dividends, amendments, and mergers.”135
Against this backdrop, the ascendant real entity or natural entity
theory “conceived of the corporation as the creation of private
initiative rather than state power.”136 Central to the real entity theory
was the belief “that a corporation is a being with attributes not found
among the humans who are its components.”137 Under this conception,
the corporation was viewed not as a mere legal fiction of “sovereign
grace” but instead with a focus on “the social reality of the business
and the creative energy of the individuals conducting it.”138 In a natural
outgrowth of this view of the corporation, many states eliminated
regulations on corporate activity, viewing it as fundamentally
analogous to individual business activity—which was not subject to
such extensive public-welfare regulation.139

132. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 107, at 920 (“In sum, the artificial entity theory is enervated,
but it is not extinct.”).
133. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 752 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636); Wichita Ctr. for Graduate Med.
Educ., Inc. v. United States, 917 F.3d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2019) (same); Prairie Capital III, L.P.
v. Double E Holding Corp., 132 A.3d 35, 59 (Del. Ch. 2015) (same).
134. Bratton, supra note 121, at 1486.
135. Id. at 1485.
136. Millon, supra note 122, at 211.
137. Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1061, 1068 (1994).
138. Bratton, supra note 121, at 1486. For representative examples of the real entity theory
from the early twentieth century, see generally George F. Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the
Corporate Entity Theory, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 128 (1917); George F. Deiser, The Juristic Person
(Pts. 1–3), 57 U. PA. L. REV. 131 (1908–1909); Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associations,
29 HARV. L. REV. 404 (1916); and Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L.
REV. 253 (1911).
139. Millon, supra note 122, at 213; see also Horwitz, supra note 127, at 182 (“The main effect
of the natural entity theory of the business corporation was to legitimate large scale enterprise
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Legal realist critiques, most notably John Dewey’s influential 1926
Yale Law Journal essay, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal
Personality,140 played a strong role in effectuating the demise of the
theory.141 Dewey argued that corporate personhood itself was entirely
indeterminate—“put roughly, ‘person’ signifies what law makes it
signify”142—and that it was merely a malleable mechanism through
which to assert the proponent’s desired policy ends.143 Dewey’s critique
largely ended discussions of corporate personhood, at least until the
1980s.144
3. Aggregation Theory. Aside from the shift from artificial to
natural entity, a second debate took place as the nineteenth century
came to a close about whether the corporation was an entity distinct
from its component individuals or rather an aggregate of those
individuals.145 Early proponents of the aggregation theory posited the
corporation as “an association formed by the agreement of its
shareholders” and argued that “the existence of a corporation as an
entity, independent[ ] of its members, is a fiction.”146 The “aggregation”
in the theory’s name referred to the notion of the corporation as “an
aggregation composed of shareholders and management, the latter
confined to labor for the interests of shareholders by standard
principles of property and trust law.”147 Adherents to this view argued
that “the fact that private individuals had chosen to do business as a

and to destroy any special basis for state regulation of the corporation that derived from its
creation by the state.”).
140. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655
(1926).
141. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 121, at 1491 (presenting Dewey’s essay as one in “a series
of persuasive critiques” that “denied the existence of a real entity”).
142. Dewey, supra note 140, at 655.
143. Id. at 669 (“Each theory has been used to serve the same ends, and each has been used
to serve opposing ends.”).
144. Horwitz, supra note 127, at 175 (“There are very few discussions of corporate personality
after Dewey.”); see also Bratton, supra note 121, at 1491 (“These critiques denied the existence
of a real entity, putting forth a conclusive case for the reified corporation. After corporate realism
disappeared, discussion of the nature of the firm in traditional legal terms nearly disappeared as
well.” (footnote omitted)).
145. Horwitz, supra note 127, at 182.
146. 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS iii
(1886).
147. Millon, supra note 122, at 222–23.
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corporation should not be a basis for subjecting their financial interests
to regulation that otherwise would not apply.”148
Aggregation theory grounded the earlier application of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
to corporations in the 1882 circuit court decision, County of San Mateo
v. Southern Pacific Railroad149 and the subsequent 1886 Supreme Court
case, County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad.150 Riding
circuit, Justice Field wrote in San Mateo:
Private corporations are, it is true, artificial persons, but . . . they
consist of aggregations of individuals united for some legitimate
business. . . . It would be a most singular result if a constitutional
provision intended for the protection of every person against partial
and discriminating legislation by the states, should cease to exert such
protection the moment the person becomes a member of a
corporation. We cannot accept such a conclusion. . . . [T]he property
of a corporation is in fact the property of the corporators. To deprive
the corporation of its property, or to burden it, is, in fact, to deprive
the corporators of their property or to lessen its value.151

Chief Justice Waite endorsed this understanding for the Court in Santa
Clara,152 although through a headnote written by the Supreme Court’s
reporter of decisions rather than a formal opinion.153

148. Id. at 214.
149. Cty. of San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R., 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (Railroad Tax Cases).
Justice Field also heard the companion Santa Clara case while riding circuit. See Cty. of Santa
Clara v. S. Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883) (Field, J.).
150. Cty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
151. Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. at 743–44, 747.
152. See, e.g., O’Kelley, supra note 107, at 1353–56 (explaining the sequence of the two
companion cases and arguing that in Santa Clara, 118 U.S. 394, the Supreme Court adopted the
rationale of Justice Field’s circuit opinions).
153. While preparing the United States Reports, Bancroft Davis, the Supreme Court
Reporter of Decisions, wrote to Chief Justice Waite asking if he had “correctly caught” the
comment before oral argument. HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN’S CONSTITUTION:
HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE “CONSPIRACY THEORY,” AND
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 567 (2013) (quoting Letter from J. C. Bancroft Davis, Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Morrison Waite, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the
U.S. (May 26, 1886)). Chief Justice Waite responded, “I think your mem. in the California
Railroad Tax cases expresses with sufficient accuracy what was said before the argument began.
I leave it with you to determine whether anything need be said about it in the report inasmuch as
we avoided meeting the constitutional question in the decision.” Id. (quoting Letter from
Morrison Waite, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to J. C. Bancroft Davis, Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the U.S. (May 31, 1886)). Davis’s headnote is the only statement on
the matter, as “no formal opinions ever were rendered by the Supreme Court on the point of
corporate personality when the circuit decisions were appealed, 1882-1886.” Howard Jay
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The Court’s more recent corporate constitutional rights cases have
not followed a uniform theory of corporate personhood.154 The legal
academy, however, has seen a renewed interest in the concept since the
1980s,155 and various commentators have argued that the leading
contemporary understanding of corporations fits within the
aggregation theory.156
B. Bellotti’s Ineffectual Test for Corporate Constitutional Rights
The Court itself has given little explicit guidance on how to
determine whether a corporation possesses a constitutional right. The
closest it has come to formulating a test for corporate constitutional
rights came in a footnote in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti157
in 1978. Writing for the Court, Justice Powell offered the supposed test:
Certain “purely personal” guarantees . . . are unavailable to
corporations and other organizations because the “historic function”
of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of
individuals. . . . Whether or not a particular guarantee is “purely
personal” or is unavailable to corporations for some other reason
depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular
constitutional provision.158

Commentators have attacked the Bellotti framework on various
grounds. For instance, Professor Darrell Miller calls it “superficially
attractive but practically disappointing,” arguing that the test fails to
reflect the Court’s actual practice of asserting corporate constitutional
rights ipse dixit.159 Miller further asserts that the test rebuffs the
recognition of many of the pre-Bellotti rights, suggests a categorical

Graham, An Innocent Abroad: The Constitutional Corporate “Person,” 2 UCLA L. REV. 155,
159–60 (1955).
154. Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 115, at 1657.
155. Saru M. Matambanadzo, The Body, Incorporated, 87 TUL. L. REV. 457, 474 (2013).
156. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993) (“The dominant legal academic view does not describe the
corporation as a social institution. Rather, the corporation is seen as the market writ small, a web
of ongoing contracts (explicit or implicit) between various real persons.”); Ho, supra note 108, at
895 (“Since the rise of the law and economics movement, dominant thinking about the nature of
the corporation has coalesced around an aggregate theory of the corporation that sees the
corporation as a ‘nexus of contracts.’”); Millon, supra note 122, at 229–31 (arguing that the post1980 nexus of contracts understanding of the corporation is a form of the aggregation theory, with
various classes of individuals whose inputs constitute the corporation).
157. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
158. Id. at 778 n.14 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698–701 (1944)).
159. Miller, supra note 107, at 912 & n.160.
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binary between protecting corporations or not that cannot be found in
existing doctrine, fails to engage with underlying understandings of
corporate personhood, and perhaps unwittingly makes the finding of
such rights a rebuttable presumption without clarifying how this
presumption may be rebutted.160 Professor Elizabeth Pollman observes
that “[t]he Court has not consistently used [the Bellotti] approach or
shown that it would be possible to do so in the context of corporations,”
arguing that the Court has neither clarified the meaning of a “purely
personal” right nor regularly looked to the “historic function” of the
right in question.161 Moreover, Pollman contends that in practice,
judicial analysis of history does not decisively settle the Founders’
views of corporate rights.162 Discussing Bellotti in the Bill of Rights
context, Professor Mark Tushnet charges that “[s]orting the
Amendments into the boxes ‘available to corporations’ and ‘not
available to corporations’ appears to require some consideration of
each Amendment’s purposes”—a process which “is itself complex.”163
Criticism abounds.
III. CORPORATE PROTECTION UNDER THE BILL OF ATTAINDER
CLAUSE
Having set out the history and precedent of the Bill of Attainder
Clause, as well as the Court’s practice of recognizing corporate
constitutional rights, this Note now shifts to demonstrate that the Bill
of Attainder Clause’s protections extend to corporations under the
existing doctrinal structures of corporate personhood and a purposive
inquiry. This Part first reviews the Second Circuit’s deficient analysis
in the only federal circuit court holding that the Clause covers
corporations. It then analyzes the corporate constitutional right against
bills of attainder under theories of corporate personhood, observing
that the contemporary theories support the Clause’s extension to
corporations, before finally discussing how the Clause’s purposes also
implicate corporations.

160. Id. at 912–13.
161. Pollman, A Corporate Right, supra note 107, at 53.
162. Id. In her line of attack on the practical value of historical inquiry, Pollman contrasts
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) with Justice
Scalia’s concurrence and Justice Stevens’s dissent. Pollman, A Corporate Right, supra note 107,
at 53 n.110.
163. Mark Tushnet, Do For-Profit Corporations Have Rights of Religious Conscience?, 99
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 70, 72 (2013).
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A. The Second Circuit’s Deficient Analysis
The Second Circuit is the only federal circuit court to decide
whether the Bill of Attainder Clause extends to corporations—holding
in ConEdison that it does.164 Although this Note argues that the Second
Circuit’s ultimate holding is correct, the court’s reasoning is deeply
flawed. The case arose out of a New York statute enacted in response
to a power outage at a ConEdison nuclear facility that was partially
responsible for providing power to New York City. In order to meet
power demands during this roughly eleven-month outage, ConEdison
needed to purchase external electricity from other sources.165 Under
existing New York law, ConEdison “would have been able to pass on
to its customers approximately $250 million in increased costs,”
according to New York State Public Service Commission estimates.166
Instead, the state legislature passed a law prohibiting ConEdison from
“recovering from its ratepayers any costs associated with replacing the
power from [the outage].”167
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Walker determined that the
Bill of Attainder Clause does apply to corporations—striking down the
New York law at issue as an unconstitutional bill of attainder against
ConEdison.168 The opinion began by quoting Chief Justice Marshall’s
artificial-entity conception of the corporation from Dartmouth
College169 before noting a range of recognized corporate constitutional
rights.170 The court then considered two statements from the Supreme
Court, dubiously viewing each to signal that the Bill of Attainder
Clause covers corporations.171
1. Supreme Court Precedent. First, the Second Circuit looked to
South Carolina v. Katzenbach,172 the 1966 Voting Rights Act case in
which the Supreme Court considered whether the word “person” in
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause encompassed states.173 The
Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren, firmly denied this
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. Pataki (ConEdison), 292 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 343.
Id. at 344–45.
Id. at 344 (quoting Act of Aug. 8, 2000, ch. 190, § 2, 2000 N.Y. Laws 2788).
Id. at 355.
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
ConEdison, 292 F.3d at 346–47.
Id. at 347.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
Id. at 323–24.

NEWMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

12/15/2019 4:42 PM

946

[Vol. 69:923

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

possibility, viewing as analogous that “courts have consistently
regarded the Bill of Attainder Clause of Article I and the principle of
the separation of powers only as protections for individual persons and
private groups, those who are peculiarly vulnerable to non-judicial
determinations of guilt.”174 The opinion cited Brown and Garland for
that proposition175—the former featuring a prohibition on Communist
Party members from belonging to labor unions176 and the latter
addressing a loyalty oath requiring all attorneys practicing in federal
court to affirm that they never served in the Confederate
government.177 In this context, “groups” most accurately refers to
groups of individuals. Katzenbach itself and both Brown and Garland
say nothing about corporations, and Katzenbach says nothing beyond
a sole line about the Bill of Attainder Clause. It strains the imagination
to understand Katzenbach as providing substantive support for the
Clause’s coverage of corporations.
In ConEdison, the Second Circuit then considered a footnote from
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,178 a 1995 case in which the Supreme Court
held that Congress had violated the separation of powers in enacting a
statute directing federal courts to reopen final judgments for a
specified class of cases.179 In Plaut, the judgment was against a
corporation—Spendthrift Farm. Justice Scalia observed that the
infringement upon the judicial power “consist[ed] not of the
Legislature’s acting in a particularized and hence . . . nonlegislative
fashion; but rather of the Legislature’s nullifying prior, authoritative
judicial action.”180 In an intervening footnote, Justice Scalia added an
ancillary remark about particularized legislation in general:
The premise that there is something wrong with particularized
legislative action is of course questionable. While legislatures usually
act through laws of general applicability, that is by no means their
only legitimate mode of action. Private bills in Congress are still
common, and were even more so in the days before establishment of
the Claims Court. Even laws that impose a duty or liability upon a
single individual or firm are not on that account invalid—or else we
would not have the extensive jurisprudence that we do concerning the
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 324 (emphasis added).
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 78.
See supra text accompanying note 55.
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
Id. at 217–18.
Id. at 239 (footnote omitted).
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Bill of Attainder Clause, including cases which say that it requires not
merely “singling out” but also punishment, and a case which says that
Congress may legislate “a legitimate class of one.”181

The Plaut footnote cannot plausibly be taken to signal a wholly novel
constitutional understanding. The Court “does not hide elephants in
mouseholes.”182 Naturally, Justice Scalia swept “firm[s]” into his
discussion to ensure its applicability to Spendthrift Farm. He made no
acknowledgement whatsoever about the never-before-announced
protection of corporations by the Bill of Attainder Clause, nor did he
cite any support for or acknowledge the potential gravity of his
statement. The Second Circuit’s single paragraph in ConEdison
discussing Katzenbach and Plaut entirely failed to account for the
contexts of those cases.183
2. Corporate Constitutional Rights Generally. After considering
precedent, the Second Circuit then considered corporate constitutional
rights more generally. It focused on the Bellotti footnote framework,
concluding that bill of attainder protection is not a purely personal
guarantee, meaning that it is a corporate constitutional right.184 The
court came to this conclusion for two reasons. First, it noted that “the
‘historical function’ of the Clause has been to ensure the procedural
protections of the judicial process for the attribution of guilt and
imposition of punishment,” a constitutional guarantee “closely related
to the right to procedural due process”185 and enjoyed by
corporations.186 Second, it asserted that “the cases in which the Court
has refused to apply constitutional rights to corporations have
uniformly involved competing state interests in regulating corporate
conduct and investigating corporate wrongdoing, which depend on a
high degree of transparency.”187 In this case, the Second Circuit
181. Id. at 239 n.9 (first emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first quoting United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 328 (1946) (Frankfurter, J. concurring); then quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977)).
182. Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (Scalia, J.) (“Congress,
we have held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or
ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”).
183. See Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 347 (2d Cir. 2002) (pulling
quotes only selectively from these opinions and without context).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 348 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413–19
(1984)).
187. Id.
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observed that “[a]lthough New York unquestionably ha[d] an interest
in investigating, regulating, and prosecuting the malfeasance of
corporations within its borders, it ha[d] no interest in inflicting
punishment for such malfeasance on the corporation’s shareholders
through the legislative process.”188 Instead, New York “ha[d] an
existing administrative procedure to vindicate the interest in exploring
utilities’ wrongdoing: the [Public Service Commission’s] prudence
review process.”189
The Second Circuit seemed to believe that the offensiveness of the
statute under review should shape the contours of the Bill of Attainder
Clause itself. Under the pretense of a generalized appraisal of the Bill
of Attainder Clause’s potential coverage of corporations, the court
engaged in a partial merits analysis of the challenge before it.
Employing the Second Circuit’s approach, a less-objectionable statute
would have weighed against recognizing the corporate constitutional
right against bills of attainder—potentially enough for the court to
have held that the Clause does not cover corporations, thereby
foreclosing an entire constitutional protection simply because the first
corporate attainder challenge decided by the court happened to be
weak on the merits. The preliminary question of whether or not there
is a corporate constitutional right is entirely distinct from the second
question of whether or not the invocation of that right will succeed in
light of the facts of the case. The court erred in considering the merits
of the challenge at issue when deciding whether the Bill of Attainder
Clause applies to corporations. Rather, it should have determined
whether the constitutional right exists generally, without relying on the
specific facts of the case. The existence of a constitutional right in the
first place cannot hinge in any part on whether or not that right was
violated.
Next, the Second Circuit analogized the Bill of Attainder Clause
to the Takings Clause’s protection of corporations, arguing that
legislative punishment, similar to legislative takings, imposes economic
injury. “For both . . . Clauses, if the protections did not extend to
corporations, their protections would be significantly undermined for
individuals” because “[w]hen a corporation suffers an economic injury,
its shareholders suffer the same economic injury.”190 The court justified
allowing corporations to challenge laws under the Clause “[i]n order to
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.

NEWMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE

12/15/2019 4:42 PM

949

protect shareholders from . . . economic injuries.”191 This explanation
is startlingly incomplete. Might corporate bill of attainder challenges
be levied only against those laws inflicting economic harm upon
shareholders? The Second Circuit wholly failed to acknowledge, for
example, punitive laws that restrict management’s freedom to make
decisions on behalf of the corporation but that do not harm
shareholders financially.
3. History. Finally, the Second Circuit considered historical
practice. The court forthrightly acknowledged that the parties and the
court were “unable to unearth any case in which a corporation has
ultimately prevailed [on the merits] in challenging legislation as a bill
of attainder.”192 Yet it favorably noted that ConEdison cited “several
English statutes that imposed disabilities on English boroughs, hardly
natural persons,”193 because they were structured as corporations.194
Perhaps these statutes were perfectly acceptable, as the mere
imposition of a disability is not the same thing as targeted legislative
punishment: Nixon very clearly observed that “[f]orbidden legislative
punishment is not involved merely because [an a]ct imposes
burdensome consequences.”195 Disabilities in this context are simply
burdensome consequences, while punishment requires a
determination of intent.196 ConEdison failed to acknowledge the
distinction, offering no evidence that the cited English statutes were
actually bills of pains and penalties.
*
*
*
As the only federal circuit court decision to hold whether or not
the Bill of Attainder Clause covers corporations, ConEdison stands on
unique ground to influence future corporate bill of attainder
challenges. Indeed, other circuits have favorably cited the Second
Circuit’s opinion when assuming without deciding that the Clause
extends to corporations.197 With a misguided and inadequate
191. Id.
192. Id. (emphasis added).
193. Id. (citing Disfranchisement of Grampound Act 1821, 1 & 2 Geo. 4 c. 47 (Eng.)).
194. See supra text accompanying note 35.
195. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977).
196. Nixon’s functional test for punishment requires exactly this. See id. at 475–76 (requiring
an inquiry into whether the legislature could have enacted the challenged law in pursuit of
nonpunitive purposes).
197. See, e.g., Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 909 F.3d 446, 453 (D.C.
Cir. 2018) (citing ConEdison for “holding that corporations are ‘individuals’ protected by the Bill
of Attainder Clause”).
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foundation, judicial administration of corporate bill of attainder
challenges is bound to suffer. In ConEdison, the Second Circuit
interpreted Supreme Court precedent in a dubious manner, assessed
the merits of the specific challenge when attempting to construe the
Clause’s general meaning, and offered an incomplete understanding of
historical practice. Rather than rely on ConEdison’s shaky analysis, the
next Section establishes that future courts should engage directly with
corporate personhood and the purposes of the Bill of Attainder Clause
in order to determine whether the Clause does in fact extend to protect
corporations.
B. Corporate Personhood Analysis
Having considered the precedent and history of the Bill of
Attainder Clause, this Note now considers corporate constitutional
rights more generally. Lying beneath the Court’s corporate
constitutional rights jurisprudence is corporate personhood, with each
of the three major theories giving rise to unique implications for a
potential corporate constitutional right against bills of attainder.
Although the Court continues to debate corporate personhood in its
corporate constitutional rights decisions,198 the influence and usage of
the artificial entity theory has fallen significantly.199 This Section argues
that the bygone artificial entity theory should be rejected because it
enables the subversion of the Clause’s existing protections of
individuals and that the real entity and aggregation theories provide
strong support for a corporate right against bills of attainder.
1. Artificial Entity Theory. Today, the artificial entity theory is the
least frequently employed of the three corporate personhood theories,
with Professor Pollman observing that the “Supreme Court had largely
shifted away from [the artificial entity] view by 1950, and the Court has
since called it an ‘extreme position.’”200 Nevertheless, incorporation
does still require government recognition, although it is a mere
formality to obtain.201 Modern proponents of the artificial entity theory

198. Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm—from Nature to Function, 118
PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 14 (2013).
199. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 120, at 1011–12 (observing the decline of the artificial
entity theory with the rise of general incorporation statutes).
200. See Pollman, A Corporate Right, supra note 107, at 37 n.42 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978)).
201. And incorporation itself remains necessary to achieve desired corporate functions
unobtainable through private ordering. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The

NEWMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE

12/15/2019 4:42 PM

951

have interpreted the concept in different ways, with some arguing for
a rebuttable presumption against corporate constitutional rights202 and
others arguing for unrestrained legislative power to deny such rights.203
Setting aside the artificial entity theory’s fall from influence, the
theory is deficient because it provides a potential means for legislatures
to subvert the Bill of Attainder Clause. The state’s power to grant a
right—in this case, the legislature’s authorization of corporate charter
itself—does not itself give the state indiscriminate power to violate that
right.204 But the artificial entity theory could mean that because the
legislature’s technical permission to incorporate is what creates the
corporation at all, the legislature can instead offer partial permission
for the corporation to exist—perhaps reserving the power to punish. If
the legislature can authorize a whole, unencumbered corporation, the
thinking goes, it can also authorize a corporation with limitations.
Regardless, the individuals comprising the corporation possess a
constitutional right against bills of attainder unaltered by an artificial
entity conception of the corporation as a concession of the state. The
Bill of Attainder Clause would be undermined if it were understood
only to protect individuals when the attainder statute singled them out
but not when a statute with identical effects and motivated by identical
legislative intent were passed instead against the corporation
comprised of those individuals. Imagine, for example, a bill of attainder
punishing a group of corporate managers for professional misbehavior
by prohibiting them from implementing certain management practices.
Punishing the corporation instead, the legislature could pass an
analogous statute singling out the corporation and having the very
same effect. Because the artificial entity theory may provide a
theoretical foundation enabling legislatures to evade the Bill of
Attainder Clause’s settled protection of individuals, the theory should
be rejected as a basis for determining whether or not the Clause applies
to corporations.
Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000) (arguing that organizational law
creates an asset-partitioning pattern in corporate entities otherwise impossible through private
contracting among owners, managers, and creditors).
202. See generally Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327
(2014) (arguing that artificial entity, or concession, theory is a viable means through which to
secure greater regulation of corporations).
203. See generally Reza Dibadj, (Mis)conceptions of the Corporation, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
731 (2013) (arguing that corporations deserve no constitutional rights beyond those expressly
bestowed upon them by the legislature).
204. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”).
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2. Real Entity Theory. The real entity theory, focusing on the
inherent distinction between the corporation itself and the people
whose energies combine to shape it, directly raises the question of
whether corporations must be covered by the Bill of Attainder Clause
in order to protect the interests of their human components.205 The
targeted legislative punishment of a corporation might very well inflict
unchecked, indirect punishment on shareholders, managers, directors,
or other employees.
Setting aside other constitutional claims, imagine a statute
targeted at a specific corporation that strips shareholders of their
rightful shares or directors of their rightful votes. Under Nixon’s
tripartite punishment analysis, a challenged statute need fail only one
or two of the three tests to be an unconstitutional bill of attainder.206
Such a statute would clearly fail the historical test for punishment
under the Bill of Attainder Clause, as it does not impose a death
sentence. However, the law might satisfy the functional test because
the burdens it imposes could be viewed to further only punitive
purposes. Similarly, the law might also satisfy the motivational test if
there were evidence of punitive legislative ambitions in the record.
Punitive legislation that only reduces the value of shareholders’
stock produces a trickier example, as it would, of course, present a
question of degree: how drastic must the effect on share price be to fail
the functional test? Absent a damning legislative record that would
emphatically satisfy the motivational test, courts might defer to
legislative judgment. In this example, however, the existing protection
of individuals under the Clause would fail to encompass the statute at
issue because the statute would single out the corporation itself rather
than the shareholders who, in effect, would receive the punishment—
even though the statute would clearly inflict punishment on the
corporation’s human stakeholders. Consequently, the Bill of Attainder
Clause would extend to corporations under the real entity theory

205. Margaret Blair and Elizabeth Pollman have traced the case law and proposed an
overarching framework describing the Court’s decision-making in its corporate constitutional
rights cases. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2015). They argue that the Court
employs an “unarticulated framework” in which it “has extended constitutional protections to
corporations when it is a necessary or convenient way to protect the rights of the natural persons
assumed to be represented by the corporation in question, at least with respect to the issue at
stake.” Id. at 1731.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 93–98.
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because corporate coverage is necessary to protect the rights of the
people behind the corporation.
3. Aggregation Theory. The aggregation theory begets the same
result as the real entity theory: corporate protection from bills of
attainder. The aggregation theory looks at the rights, duties, and
expectations of a corporation’s constituent natural persons and seeks
to ensure a meaningful degree of equality between those and the legal
entitlements the constituents would have had if they had not opted to
utilize the corporate form to do business. A statute targeting a
corporation that reduces the value of shareholders’ rightful shares or
strips directors of their rightful votes would, in effect, impose a penalty
on those individuals for voluntarily incorporating rather than
contracting in an ad hoc fashion. This outcome would be impermissible
under the aggregation theory, as the corporation’s stakeholders would
enjoy fewer legal entitlements—in this case, constitutional rights—
solely because they chose to incorporate. Under this theory, the Bill of
Attainder Clause would extend to corporations as well.
C. The Purposes of the Bill of Attainder Clause
A complete analysis of the Bill of Attainder Clause’s potential
extension to corporations must also consider whether the Clause’s
purposes necessarily implicate corporations in similar ways to
individuals, who unquestionably fall within the Clause’s coverage.
While some jurists have argued that the Bill of Attainder Clause’s
purpose was to prevent the legislature from enacting criminal
punishments,207 today the Clause extends beyond the criminal realm
and into punishment more broadly.208 Commentators have offered
various views of the Bill of Attainder Clause’s purpose over the
decades,209 and Professor Aaron Caplan has synthesized the most

207. See, e.g., COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 28, at 285 (“It is conceded on all
sides, that the purpose of the constitutional inhibition is . . . in short, wholly to deprive the
government of any power to inflict legislative punishment for criminal, or supposed criminal,
conduct.”).
208. The Court’s entire sequence of bill of attainder cases supports this view. See supra Part
I.B.
209. See generally, e.g., Comment, The Constitutional Prohibition of Bills of Attainder: A
Waning Guaranty of Judicial Trial, 63 YALE L.J. 844 (1954) (arguing that the Clause’s purpose is
to secure the safeguards of judicial trial before the government may invade personal security and
private rights); Ely, Comment, supra note 81 (arguing that the Clause’s purpose is to implement
the separation of powers by preventing “the legislature from exercising the judicial function” of
determining “who comes within the purview of its general rules”); Charles H. Wilson, Jr.,
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influential proposals into four key constitutional values served by the
Clause: procedural fairness, separation of powers, equality, and the
elimination of political persecution.210
1. Procedural Fairness. Professor Akhil Amar describes the
procedural fairness element, observing that the Clause’s purpose is
partially “rooted in narrow ideas of adjudicative due process.”211 “In
general,” he stresses, “the legislature must prescribe penalties
generally and prospectively, behind a suitably impersonal veil of
ignorance.”212 The prohibition on bills of attainder prevents the
legislature from “singl[ing] out its enemies—or the politically
unpopular—and condemn[ing] them for who they are, or for what they
have done in the past and can no longer change.”213 Instead, “[t]he
Attainder Clause channels punishment into the courts which are
governed by the many procedural protections of Article III and of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.”214 Corporations, too, may suffer if
punished without a fair process.
While the nature of legislative adjudication of corporate
punishment differs from that directed toward natural persons,215 it is
subject to the same potential procedural abuses. In prohibiting the
legislature from condemning specified actors for who they are or what
they have previously done, the Bill of Attainder Clause’s purpose of
preserving procedural fairness implicates corporations.

Comment, The Supreme Court’s Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Need for Clarification, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 212 (1966) (arguing that “the constitutional proscription of bills of attainder is a guarantee
of procedural due process”); David Kairys, Note, The Bill of Attainder Clauses and Legislative
and Administrative Suppression of “Subversives,” 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1490 (1967) (arguing that
“the principal evil the clauses were meant to combat” was “the use of legislative power to suppress
political opposition”); Griffith, supra note 70 (arguing that the Clause’s primary purpose is
“shielding political activity protected by the first amendment from retroactive legislative
sanctions”).
210. Aaron H. Caplan, Nonattainder as a Liberty Interest, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1203, 1232–37.
211. Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV.
203, 209 (1996).
212. Id. at 210.
213. Id.
214. Caplan, supra note 210, at 1233.
215. Compare Act of Aug. 8, 2000, ch. 190, § 2, 2000 N.Y. Laws 2788, invalidated by Consol.
Edison Co. of New York v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 2002) (effectively imposing a $250
million fine on an identified corporation), with 1778 Mass. Acts 912 (banning named individuals
from returning to their home province).
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2. Separation of Powers. Professor John Hart Ely offers the
defining account of the Bill of Attainder Clause as an exercise of the
separation of powers, arguing that the Clause “establishes that there
are certain types of decision that are in varying degrees inappropriate
for legislative resolution, although specific definition of those
limitations . . . appears impossible.”216 Professor Laurence Tribe has
also endorsed this view.217 And the Court asserted in Brown that “the
Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as a narrow,
technical . . . prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the
separation of powers, a general safeguard against legislative exercise
of the judicial function, or more simply—trial by legislature.”218 Indeed,
“the Legislative Branch is not so well suited as politically independent
judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the blameworthiness of, and
levying appropriate punishment upon, specific persons.”219
The legislature is no more equipped to mete out punishment to
corporations than to individuals; nothing inherent in the corporate
form distinguishes it from natural persons in this regard. Operating to
preserve separation of powers, the Bill of Attainder Clause concerns
corporations as well as individuals.
3. Equality. Professor Amar also observes the equality purpose of
the Clause, as the legislature’s properly drawn punitive laws—general
and prospective in nature—afford “[t]hose who seek to avoid the
noose . . . fair warning that they must refrain from [the outlawed]
conduct.”220 Professor Roderick Hills refers to this as the Clause’s “rule
against closed classes,” because while the Clause “do[es] not
necessarily bar legal burdens based on status per se,” it does bar such
burdens imposed through “classifications based on ‘irreversible’
status—that is, on legally closed classifications with a membership that
is, therefore, permanently fixed upon enactment.”221 This rule is
designed to prevent the legislature from being able to “launch ‘surgical
strikes’ against unpopular groups, confident that such burdens will not

216. Ely, Comment, supra note 81, at 343 (emphasis omitted).
217. See TRIBE, supra note 13, at 657 (describing three strands of separation of powers values
served by the Clause).
218. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965).
219. Id. at 445.
220. Amar, supra note 211, at 210.
221. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Amendment 2 Really a Bill of Attainder? Some Questions About
Professor Amar’s Analysis of Romer, 95 MICH. L. REV. 236, 241 (1996).
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affect favored constituents upon whom the legislator depends.”222 And
the rule itself emerges out of the “tradition of minimal impartiality,”
“a deep constitutional tradition that governmental decisions cannot
rest on a mere desire to impose costs on one person or group for the
benefit of another person or group; the identity of the burdened
persons ought to be irrelevant to the purpose of the burden.”223
Without the rule against closed classes, it “is otherwise impossible to
guarantee [a minimal degree of impartiality] in the legislative context
through institutional design,” unlike in the judicial context.224
When the legislature specifies the target of a bill of attainder, it
imposes punishment based on the target’s fixed identity. A corporation
singled out on the basis of “who” it is can no less escape punishment
than can individuals singled out on the basis of who they are.
Maintaining the equality of the legislature’s laws in their application,
the Bill of Attainder Clause embraces corporations.
4. Elimination of Political Persecution. Caplan notes that the Bill
of Attainder Clause “joins a cluster of constitutional provisions that
seek to eliminate political persecution and show trials.”225 In his
historical account of English bills of attainder, Professor Zechariah
Chafee documented that most were used to remove high officials from
office, either because the King himself sought the disposal of members
of his administration who had grown too powerful or because
Parliament needed a practical outlet to placate a populace unhappy
with royal policies.226 But the Constitution establishes impeachment as
the only mechanism for the congressional removal of high officials.227
The Bill of Attainder Clause, Caplan asserts, “serves to channel
legislative discontent against ministers into the impeachment process
where it belongs.”228
Whether or not the political-persecution purpose implicates
corporations depends on its level of abstraction. If the Clause is viewed

222. Id. at 242.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Caplan, supra note 210, at 1236. Caplan mentions the Bill of Attainder Clause alongside
the Treason Clause. Id.
226. CHAFEE, supra note 23, at 103.
227. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 198–204
(2005) (explaining the mechanics and rationale of the Article II Impeachment Clause and its
differences from the English impeachment process).
228. Caplan, supra note 210, at 1237.
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merely as a formal channeling mechanism into the impeachment
process, the purposes of its protections do not implicate corporations.
But if the Clause instead stands as a bulwark against the political
passions of the majority, corporations are implicated in much the same
way as individuals; legislators can foment anger against corporate
enemies just as they rouse the citizenry against natural persons reputed
to be antagonists.229
CONCLUSION
Politicians on both sides of the aisle are increasingly stoking
populist resentment of corporate America,230 while the concentration
of wealth among the largest corporations continues to grow.231 At the
same time, the federal government has grown increasingly suspicious
of a range of foreign corporations doing business in the United States,
as it faces the prospect of heavy-handed nation-states leaning on their
globally integrated corporate underlings to perform cyberespionage by

229. Cf. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC), TWITTER (Feb. 14, 2019, 1:42 PM),
https://twitter.com/AOC/status/1096117499492478977?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5E
[https://perma.cc/T4UZ-UEFC] (“Anything is possible: today was the day a group of dedicated,
everyday New Yorkers & their neighbors defeated Amazon’s corporate greed, its worker
exploitation, and the power of the richest man in the world.”).
230. See, e.g., Matt Laslo, Josh Hawley Says Tech Enables ‘Some of the Worst of America,’
WIRED (Aug. 16, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/josh-hawley-tech-enables-worstof-america [https://perma.cc/XG2T-A4V5] (“[The dominant tech firms] are companies that are
supposed to represent the best of America, but in the last couple of decades, I think they’ve given
us some of the worst of America. We’re dealing with pathologies that they have at the least
contributed to.”); Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8,
2019),
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c
[https://perma.cc/7PZC-ZD7D] (“Today’s big tech companies have too much power — too much
power over our economy, our society, and our democracy. They’ve bulldozed competition, used
our private information for profit, and tilted the playing field against everyone else. And in the
process, they have hurt small businesses and stifled innovation.”).
231. See, e.g., Antoine Gara, Growing Wealth Inequality Hits America’s Largest Corporations,
FORBES (May 20, 2016, 4:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2016/05/20/growingwealth-inequality-hits-americas-largest-corporations/#469f1e125eb8 [https://perma.cc/YCC678QD] (“The top 1%, measured by S&P as the 25 companies with the highest cash balances,
controls 51% of the cash in Corporate America, up from 38% five years ago.”).
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proxy.232 This is where Huawei, the target of a custom-fitting statute
banning the federal use of its products, enters the picture.233
This Note seeks to guide the conversation about the Bill of
Attainder Clause’s potential protection of corporations. Huawei’s
lawsuit is already the second in as many years challenging a
congressional ban on a foreign corporation’s products.234 Most
recently, at a dispositive motion hearing in Huawei’s case, the district
court ordered supplemental briefing on whether, as a threshold matter,
the Bill of Attainder Clause applies to corporations.235 Huawei,
however, is expected to lose the suit236 as the government has a strong,
nonpunitive national security rationale for the ban and an inoffensive
legislative history on its side. But ConEdison shows that corporate bill
of attainder challenges are not inherently doomed. Corporations may
soon challenge punitive regulatory laws as bills of attainder with
increased frequency. Legislators must understand the full extent of the
Constitution if they are to act responsibly in enacting laws, and
corporate litigants should understand the full extent of their
constitutional rights when facing putative statutory punishments. The
Bill of Attainder Clause raises earnest considerations for both camps.

232. China and Russia, for example, are the two largest state sponsors of cyberattacks on the
West. Charles Hymas, China Is Ahead of Russia as ‘Biggest State Sponsor of Cyber-Attacks on the
West,’ TELEGRAPH (Oct. 9, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018/
10/09/china-ahead-russia-biggest-state-sponsor-cyber-attacks-west [https://perma.cc/RD3K55DJ]. Each country is the home to countless corporations with American subsidiaries.
233. See, e.g., Kate Fazzini, Why the US Government Is So Suspicious of Huawei, CNBC (Dec.
6, 2018, 7:04 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/06/huaweis-difficult-history-with-usgovernment.html [https://perma.cc/7WQN-LD2E] (“Starting around 2010, U.S. intelligence
officials began warning agencies, and then private companies, of what it said were clear-cut cases
of [Huawei] serving as a proxy for espionage conducted by the Chinese government . . . .”).
234. See Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 311 F. Supp. 3d 187, 223
(D.D.C.) (dismissing the bill of attainder challenge of the American subsidiary of a Russian
corporation to a congressional ban on the federal use of its products), aff’d, 909 F.3d 446 (D.C.
Cir. 2018).
235. Transcript of Oral Argument at 106, Huawei Techs. USA, Inc. v. United States (E.D.
Tex. Sept. 19, 2019) (No. 4:19-cv-00159).
236. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Opinion, Huawei’s Lawsuit Against U.S. Won’t Win in Court,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2019, 9:19 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-12/
huawei-technologies-v-u-s-constitutional-argument-won-t-work [https://perma.cc/7N9A-FM5J]
(“The bill of attainder argument is therefore exceedingly weak, and more or less guaranteed to
fail.”); see also Evan Zoldan, The Hidden Issue in Huawei’s Suit Against the United States, JUST
SECURITY (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/63408/the-hidden-issue-in-huaweis-suitagainst-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/QC2Q-488E] (acknowledging that Huawei is likely to
lose in its bill of attainder claim).

